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Abstract
We set up a probabilistic voting model to explore the hypothesis that
tax competition improves public sector eﬃciency and social welfare. In
the absence of tax base mobility, distortions in the political process induce
vote-maximising politicians to create rents to public sector employees. Al-
lowing tax base mobility may be welfare-enhancing up to a point, because
the ensuing tax competition will reduce rents. However, if tax competi-
tion is carried too far, it will reduce welfare by causing an underprovision
of public goods. Starting from an equilibrium where tax competition
has eliminated all rents, a coordinated rise in capital taxation will al-
ways be welfare-improving. For plausible parameter values it will even be
welfare-enhancing to carry tax coordination beyond the point where rents
to public sector workers start to emerge.
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THE EFFECTS OF TAX COMPETITION
WHEN POLITICIANS CREATE RENTS
TO BUY POLITICAL SUPPORT
Wolfgang Eggert and Peter Birch Sørensen
1. Tax competition and Leviathan
The globalisation of economic activity has sharpened the international debate on
the costs and benefits of tax competition. Critics argue that such competition will
lead to an underprovision of public goods as governments undercut each others’
tax rates in an attempt to attract mobile tax bases. The theoretical foundations
for this view were laid by Oates (1972), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson
(1986), Wildasin (1989) and Janeba and Peters (1999), among others. In the
opposite camp it is argued that tax competition helps to reduce government waste
and to discipline rent-seeking politicians and bureaucrats. According to Public
Choice theorists such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980), government is an
ever-expanding Leviathan that needs to be tamed, and one way of ‘starving the
beast’ is to allow interjurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases.1
This sceptical view of government which welcomes tax competition seems to
have gained ground in recent years. A popular version of the argument that tax
competition increases public sector eﬃciency assumes that self-serving politicians
and bureaucrats are somehow able to divert the taxpayer’s money away from uses
that benefit the general public and into uses that are pure waste from society’s
viewpoint. It is then argued that tax competition hampers this diversion of re-
sources away from beneficial public use, since growing mobility of tax bases raises
the marginal cost of public funds, thereby hardening voter resistance to govern-
ment waste. For example, the World Bank (2004, p. 53) vividly argues that
decentralization ‘permits a degree of institutional competition between centers of
authority that can . . . reduce the risk that governments will expropriate wealth’.
Edwards and Keen (1996) attempted to synthesize the conflicting views on
tax competition. In their analysis politicians maximise an objective function of
1This argument for tax competition is very diﬀerent from those oﬀered in the classical contri-
butions by Hayek (1939) and Tiebout (1956). Tiebout did not assume a Leviathan government,
but argued that fiscal competition would allow mobile households to locate in those jurisdictions
that oﬀered their most preferred level and mix of public services.
1
the form V (R,U), where R is the rent appropriated by the politicians themselves
(which is modelled as pure waste), and U is the welfare of the representative cit-
izen. Thus politicians trade oﬀ the interests of voters against rents to themselves.
Combining this objective function with a standard model of tax competition where
the marginal source of public funds is a source-based tax on mobile capital, Ed-
wards and Keen demonstrated that tax competition will have two oﬀsetting eﬀects
on consumer welfare. On the one hand it will tend to raise welfare by reducing
the volume of rents appropriated by politicians. On the other hand it will tend
to cause an underprovision of public goods by raising the marginal cost of public
funds. On balance, Edwards and Keen found that if the elasticity of the tax base
with respect to the tax rate is lower than the politicians’ marginal propensity to
spend public funds on ‘waste’, tax competition will be preferable to tax coordin-
ation, and vice versa.
Several other authors including Oates and Schwab (1988), Fuest (2000),
Rauscher (2000), Eggert (2001), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), Sato (2003),
Wilson and Gordon (2003) and Wilson (2005) have analysed the eﬀects of tax
competition in Leviathan models where policy makers appropriate part of the
tax revenue for their own purposes. Janeba and Schjelderup (2002) have studied
how tax competition aﬀects the ability of politicians to appropriate rents under
alternative political institutions, and Besley and Smart (2007) have investigated
the eﬀects of various constraints on fiscal policy (including tax competition) when
imperfectly informed voters face the challenge of distinguishing Leviathan-type
politicians from benevolent political candidates. Whereas these contributions have
tended to find that tax competition may play an eﬃciency-enhancing role, Cai and
Treisman (2005) show in a Leviathan type model with asymmetric regions that tax
competition may actually generate more government ‘waste’ in poorly endowed
regions.
While all of these studies have generated valuable insights, the positive and
normative analysis of public policy in traditional Leviathan models has several
problematic features. First, the modelling of rents as pure waste goes against
the fundamental normative principle that the welfare of all citizens (including
rent-seekers) should be allowed to count in the social welfare function. Second, in
Leviathan models rent creation typically reduces political support for the policy
maker because rents are achieved at the expense of the welfare of voters. This
may be a reasonable way of modelling the kind of rent-seeking that takes the form
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of unnecessary and wasteful luxury for top government oﬃcials, but in most west-
ern democracies this type of rent is probably of minor quantitative importance
relative to total income. Instead it appears that rents are typically created with
the purpose of obtaining political support from the recipients. Thus, whereas the
Leviathan literature assumes that rent creation always reduces the policy maker’s
political backing, it seems more realistic to assume that rents are generated be-
cause they increase the likelihood that those responsible for creating them will
remain in government oﬃce.2 Third, a variable such as the fraction of public rev-
enue that is wasted - which plays a crucial role in the Leviathan literature - is not
very operational from an empirical perspective. The concept of government waste
is very subjective; what seems waste to one person may be a useful government
activity in the eyes of another person. To be able to subject political economy
models of tax competition to empirical testing, it seems desirable to develop meas-
ures of ‘political distortions’ that are more objective and hence easier to identify
empirically.3
In this paper we present a political economy framework allowing an analysis
of the eﬀects of tax competition and tax coordination on rent seeking and social
welfare in a setting where rents are created as part of a political strategy to
maximise the probability of winning the election. Instead of considering rents
as pure waste, we thus treat them as a means of redistributing income in favour
of politically influential groups. Our model allows for a political distortion in
favour of public sector workers, say, due to the existence of strong public sector
trade unions. As an empirical matter, we do not actually postulate that public
sector employees always have a disproportionate influence on the political process,
2Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) provide evidence from the United States that governing
political parties at the state level do in fact skew the distribution of public funds in favour of
areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support.
3In an interesting recent paper Angelopoulos et al. (2006) incorporate rent-seeking into an
otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of the European econom-
ies. The calibrated version of this model allows an estimate of the fraction of time spent on
unproductive rent-seeking activities aimed at diverting public revenues into private hands. In
the model of Angelopoulos et al. this fraction turns out to be large. However, as the authors
recognize themselves, the ability of a standard DSGE model to generate realistic employment
fluctuations (with a plausible labour supply elasticity) is improved whenever one introduces a
third use of time in addition to leisure and market work. In the authors’ model rent-seeking
represents such a third use of time, but a similar improvement in the model’s ability to fit the
data might have been achieved by introducing another alternative use of time such as home
production (see, e.g., Greenwood et al. (1995)).
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but we explore the implications of this assumption because it is implicit in the
reasoning of many advocates of tax competition.
Our study oﬀers a synthesis of the traditional Public Finance view of tax
competition and the view of the Public Choice school by embedding a probabilistic
voting model of the type proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 3) in a tax
competition model similar to the one used by Edwards and Keen.4 In our model
the often vague concept of ‘political distortion’ has a very precise meaning. Our
indicator of the degree of political distortion depends on the size of the public
sector lobby and on the relative political influence of an individual lobby member,
measured by the derivatives of the voting function maximised by politicians. The
greater the sensitivity of voting behaviour to a change in economic benefits oﬀered
to a lobby member, the greater is his political influence relative to the influence
of a voter outside the lobby.5
In our framework tax competition is a powerful institutional device which
may completely wipe out rents to public sector workers, but only at the cost of an
underprovision of public goods. Unlike the Leviathan literature, this paper oﬀers
a theory of the ’political transmission mechanism’ through which tax competition
leads to reduced rent creation as well as reduced public goods provision. In our set-
up politicians may capture more votes from public sector workers by paying them
higher wages, and they may also attract votes by creating additional high-paying
public sector jobs. At the same time politicians may gain votes by oﬀering higher
private consumption opportunities through lower taxes. In political equilibrium,
political candidates strike a balance between these competing ways of gaining
votes, accounting for the government budget constraint. When tax competition
is allowed, the amount of private consumption that must be sacrificed to raise
4Our paper may also be seen as an extension of some ideas in Wilson (1989) who studies
optimal constraints on the tax base in a world where the tax rate is controlled by a policy maker
who diverts resources from spending on public goods towards a favoured group of consumers.
Such behaviour by the policy maker could be interpreted as an attempt to buy votes from an
influential interest group, but unlike us, Wilson (op.cit.) does not explicitly model the political
process, and he does not consider the eﬀects of tax competition.
5To limit the scope of the paper, we do not consider whether tax competition leads to
less corruption and whether it can be used to generate valuable information to voters. Much
empirical work on the eﬃciency eﬀects of fiscal federalism has focused on the relationship between
fiscal decentralisation and corruption. In a cross-country panel study using the International
Country Risk Guide’s corruption index, Fissman and Gatti (2002) find a significant negative
relationship between corruption and decentralization. Huther and Shah (1998) obtain similar
results using similar indicators of corruption constructed by the World Bank.
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a unit of tax revenue goes up, so financing the public sector wage bill becomes
costlier in economic and political terms. The vote-maximizing political strategy
will then involve lower rents to public sector workers and fewer public sector jobs
(and hence less public service provision).
A main point in this explanation of the impact of tax competition on the
political equilibrium is that the public sector workers earning rents are part of the
voting population, so a cut in rents comes at a cost to vote-maximizing politicians.
Obviously, this political cost arises from the fact that the fall in rents induced
by tax competition reduces the utility of public sector workers. By recognizing
this, our framework allows us to identify an optimal degree of tax competition,
accounting for the welfare of all citizens. The standard Leviathan models of tax
competition are unsuited for this purpose because they postulate that rents do not
generate welfare for any citizen, and because they do not account for the fact that
tax competition - by changing the size of the public sector - will also change the
composition of the voting population, thereby aﬀecting the political equilibrium
and the distribution of welfare.
Qualitatively, tax competition aﬀects social welfare through three diﬀerent
channels in our model: 1) By driving a wedge between the marginal rate of sub-
stitution and the marginal rate of transformation between public and private
goods, it tends to reduce aggregate welfare. This is the welfare-reducing eﬀect of
tax competition emphasized in the literature assuming that policy is made by a
benevolent social planner. 2) By reducing rents to public sector workers, tax com-
petition equalizes the marginal rate of substitution between public and private
goods across private and public sector workers. Ceteris paribus, this results in
an outward shift of the utility possibility frontier which tends to increase social
welfare. 3) By curbing rents to public sector workers, tax competition also equal-
izes the marginal utility of income for all citizens. In a society concerned about
equality, this likewise tends to increase social welfare. By including the mechan-
isms 2) and 3), our analysis accounts for both of the standard criticisms against
rent-seeking, i.e., the objections that it ineﬃcient as well as unfair.
We first consider the case where governments non-cooperatively choose the
level of capital taxation, public sector rents and employment. We show that
an increase in tax base mobility will initially tend to be welfare-increasing, but
beyond a certain point which depends inter alia on the political strength of the
public sector lobby, a further increase in tax base mobility will reduce welfare
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as the underprovision of public goods becomes more serious. In a quantitative
version of the model we trace the impact of increasing the number of competing tax
jurisdictions and rank diﬀerent scenarios in welfare terms to identify the economic
and political conditions under which tax competition is preferable to autarky. Our
findings suggest that tax competition is a badly targeted remedy against political
distortions.
We then analyze the eﬀects of international tax coordination on social welfare.
When individual countries are too small to aﬀect the world interest rate, some
amount of international tax coordination will be welfare-improving under very
mild conditions. Indeed, we find that it may be welfare-enhancing to carry tax
coordination beyond the point where rents to public sector workers start to emerge.
In section 2 we set up our model. Section 3 analyses how the political equi-
librium is influenced by tax competition while section 4 studies how international
tax coordination aﬀects rent seeking and social welfare. Section 5 summarises our
main conclusions, and three technical appendices document the results reported
in the text.
2. The model
We consider a world economy consisting of n symmetric countries. Residents in
each country can either work in the private or in the public sector, and they
consume private goods as well as a pure public good. Labour is the only input
into the production of the public good, while private goods are produced by means
of capital and labour. Capital is perfectly mobile across countries, whereas labour
is immobile internationally. There are no international spillovers from the supply
of public goods, but since public expenditure is financed by a source-based tax on
capital, there is a fiscal externality arising from interjurisdictional competition for
the mobile tax base. All countries produce the same good, so national tax policies
have no eﬀects on the commodity terms of trade.
Politicians choose the level of taxation, the level of public service provision and
the public sector wage rate with the purpose of maximising the probability of being
voted into oﬃce. Voters are split into a group of well-organised ‘insiders’ employed
in the public sector and a group of non-organised ‘outsiders’ mainly employed
in the private sector. By increasing the economic welfare of the members of a
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particular group, politicians can increase the expected number of votes from that
group. The model enables us to specify the exact conditions under which rents to
public sector employees will arise. A central issue to be explored is whether tax
competition will tend to reduce such rents and move public sector employment
closer to its socially optimal level.
Below we present the details of the model.
2.1. Tastes and technology
We use the subscript g for variables relating to a government sector employee and
the subscript p for variables referring to a private sector employee. All agents have
identical preferences with respect to consumption (but not with respect to non-
economic aspects of public policy, see sec. 2.4), and the total economic welfare Uj
of a worker employed in sector j is
Uj = u (Cj) + g (G) , j = g, p; (2.1)
u0 > 0, u00 < 0, g0 > 0, g00 < 0,
where Cj is private consumption and G is the non-rival consumption of the public
good. Note that since individual working time is assumed to be institutionally
fixed, there is no need to allow for the disutility of work in the utility function (2.1).
The total population and labour force is normalised to unity and the fraction
of the labour force employed in the public sector is denoted by α, 0 < α < 1. Total
capital input into private sector production is (1− α) k, where k is the capital-
labour ratio, and the total output of private goods (Y ) is given by the linearly
homogeneous production function
Y = F ((1− α) k, 1− α) , (2.2)
implying that the average productivity of a private sector worker is
y ≡ Y
1− α = F (k, 1) ≡ f (k) , f
0 > 0, f 00 < 0. (2.3)
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The public good is produced by a simple linear technology with labour as the only
input:
G = α. (2.4)
At the start of the period considered, each country in the world is endowed with
a fixed total capital stock k. All countries are assumed to be symmetric, with
identical labour forces, capital endowments, tastes and technologies.
2.2. The first-best allocation
For later reference it will be useful to characterize the first-best allocation of
resources in our simple world economy, assuming that the social planner in the
representative country wishes to maximise the utilitarian social welfare function
SW = α [u (Cg) + g (α)] + (1− α) [u (Cp) + g (α)] . (2.5)
One condition for global optimality is global production eﬃciency which requires
that capital’s marginal product be equalized across countries. With identical
countries this is achieved when investment in each country equals the country’s
fixed capital endowment. Hence optimality is attained when the social welfare
function (2.5) is maximised with respect to Cg, Cp, and α, subject to the resource
constraint
αCg + (1− α)Cp = F
¡
k, 1− α
¢
. (2.6)
Denoting the marginal product of private sector labour input by FL, the first-order
conditions for the solution to this problem can be shown to imply
u0 (Cg) = u0 (Cp) =⇒ Cg = Cp = C, (2.7)
g0 (α)
u0 (C)
= FL
¡
k, 1− α
¢
. (2.8)
Equation (2.7) states that private consumption levels must be equalized so as
to equalize the marginal utility of consumption across the two groups of workers.
This condition may be said to reflect policy concerns about equity. Equation (2.8)
is the Samuelson condition for the optimal supply of public goods, stating that
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between private and public goods
should equal the marginal rate of transformation (recall that the total population
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is normalised to unity, so the left-hand side of (2.8) is the sum of the marginal
rates of substitution). Clearly, (2.8) captures policy concerns about eﬃciency.
We will now study whether the market-based allocation will diﬀer from this
first-best optimum.
2.3. The market economy
Competitive profit-maximising firms invest up to the point where capital’s mar-
ginal product equals the cost of capital, implying
f 0 (k) = r + τ , (2.9)
where r is the after-tax interest rate and τ is a source-based unit tax on capital.
From (2.9) it follows that capital intensity is given by
k = k (r + τ) , k0 = 1/f 00 < 0. (2.10)
Moreover, (2.9) and the linear homogeneity of the production function imply that
the private sector real wage (w) is
w (r + τ) = f (k (r + τ))− (r + τ) k (r + τ) , w0 = −k. (2.11)
Capital is perfectly mobile across countries. With source-based capital tax-
ation, this means that all the n countries in the world face the same after-tax
interest rate r. A global capital market equilibrium is attained when
(1− α) k (r + τ) + (n− 1) (1− bα)bk (r + bτ) = nk, (2.12)
where (1− α) k (r + τ) is capital demand in the domestic country under consider-
ation, and (1− bα)bk (r + bτ) is capital demand in each of the n−1 identical foreign
countries. Thus the left-hand side of (2.12) measures the global demand for capital
which must equal the fixed global capital supply, nk. By implicit diﬀerentiation
of (2.12) we may find the isolated eﬀects of domestic tax and spending policies on
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the after-tax interest rate, exploiting the symmetry assumption that all countries
end up choosing the same policies in equilibrium:6
∂r
∂τ
= − (1− α) k
0
(1− α) k0 + (n− 1) (1− bα)bk0 = −1n, (2.13)
∂r
∂α
=
k
(1− α) k0 + (n− 1) (1− bα)bk0 = kn (1− α) k0 . (2.14)
When choosing their fiscal policy platforms, politicians account for these policy
eﬀects on the interest rate.
To focus on the potential conflicts of interest between private and public sector
employees, we assume that capital endowments are equally distributed across the
working population. Recalling that the total labour force is normalised at unity,
this means that each worker owns the amount of capital k. Denoting the public
sector wage rate by W , the private consumption of the two types of workers is
then given by
Cg =W + rk, Cp = w + rk. (2.15)
2.4. The political economy of fiscal policy
The policy variables in our model are W , G and τ . We wish to provide a simple
framework in which these variables are chosen by politicians competing for votes.
Inspired by Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 3), we describe the political process
by a probabilistic voting model with lobbyism. In our particular version of this
model, voters are split into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The insiders are all employed
in the public sector and all belong to a lobby (say, a trade union) which enforces
the wage rate W throughout the public sector in order to prevent underbidding
from outsiders. The outsiders are those voters who do not belong to the lobby.
These individuals are employed either in the public or in the private sector. Thus
the ‘marginal’ workers in the public sector are outsiders although they are paid
the same wage as the insiders. As we shall see below, in the absence of tax
competition the public sector wage rate will generally exceed the private sector
wage. The marginal high-paying public sector jobs that are not already filled by
the insiders are allocated to some of the outsiders. Flexible wage adjustment in
6The symmetry assumption implies that α = bα and τ = bτ in equilibrium so that
(1− α) k0 (r + τ) = (1− bα)bk0 (r + bτ).
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the private labour market ensures that those outsiders who do not get a public
sector job are all able to find private sector employment.
Our categorization of public sector workers into insiders and outsiders is mo-
tivated by the observation that some groups of civil servants are often employed on
long-term contracts providing a high degree of job security whereas other public
sector workers are appointed on short-term contracts oﬀering less job protection.
Our distinction between public sector insiders who have full job security and the
marginal public sector workers who can easily be dismissed captures this observed
diﬀerence in the terms of employment in a stylised way. Note that the stronger at-
tachment of insiders to the public sector could explain why this group has formed
a lobby to protect their interests whereas the marginal workers with a looser link
to the public sector do not enter the lobby.
Visser (2006) documents that public sector workers in the OECD area are in
fact better organised than workers in the private sector, as reflected in a much
higher degree of unionisation in the public sector. Our assumption that only pub-
lic sector insiders have formed a lobby seeks to capture this marked diﬀerence
across sectors in a simple way. Whether the higher union density implies that
public sector workers actually earn rents is ultimately an empirical issue. As we
show in Appendix 1, if private sector workers are a very tightly knit group in
terms of ideological preferences, they could be politically more influential than
public sector workers even if they have not formed a lobby. However, the prob-
abilistic voting model considered below does imply that public sector workers
generally earn rents under autarky. Our assumption that (organised) public sec-
tor voters constitute a strong interest group capable of extracting rents is made
because it seems to be implicit in the reasoning of many of those who advocate
tax competition as a remedy against rent seeking.7 Our purpose is to investigate
whether fiscal competition could indeed be an appropriate means of curbing an
excessive political influence of public sector workers. While we do not wish to
pass a verdict on whether such an excess influence actually exists, we note that
7If private sector workers were politically more influential than those employed in the public
sector, the model set up below implies that an unconstrained political candidate would ideally
want to keep the public sector wage rate below that in the private sector in order to keep taxes
low. However, this scenario would not illustrate the interdependence between public sector
rents and tax competition which is the focus of the present paper. Moreover, with flexible wage
adjustment preventing involuntary unemployment in the private sector, the public sector would
face a recruitment problem if it oﬀered a lower wage rate than the private sector.
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most of the empirical studies surveyed by Bender (1998) do find a positive central
government-private sector wage diﬀerential in the U.S. and Western Europe.8
Let us now describe the details of the political process, drawing heavily on
the framework proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, sec. 3.5). There are
two political parties (A and B) competing for government oﬃce. Each party
chooses a fiscal policy package consisting of a level of public service provision, a
public sector wage rate and a capital tax rate. The two parties diﬀer in some
‘ideological’ dimension and voters have diﬀerent individual preferences regarding
this non-economic aspect of policy. Let UPi denote the economic welfare of a
public sector insider in case the policy of party P is implemented, P = A,B. An
individual member j of the public sector insider lobby will then vote for party A
if
UAi > U
B
i + ρ
j
i + eω, (2.16)
where ρji is an individual ideological bias in favour of partyB, with zero mean value
across all lobby members, and eω is a general (stochastic) ideological preference in
favour of that party, capturing any underlying political mood aﬀecting all voters.
Similarly, if UPo is the expected economic welfare of an outsider in case party P ’s
economic policy is implemented, voter v in the group of outsiders will prefer party
A if UAo > UBo + ρvo + eω. The general ideological bias is assumed to be given by
eω = ω + h · (αiZB − αiZA) , h > 0, 0 < αi < 1. (2.17)
Here ω is a stochastic term with mean zero, ZP is the public sector lobby’s cam-
paign eﬀort in support of party P , measured per member of the lobby, and αi
is the predetermined fraction of voters belonging to the lobby so that αiZP is
the total lobby support for party P . The campaign eﬀort could take the form of
8Falch and Strøm (2005) also find evidence from Norway that various indicators of the polit-
ical strength of public sector employees have a positive impact on public sector wage rates.
However, these authors do not investigate whether public sector workers are generally better
paid than corresponding groups of workers in the private sector.
Whether public sector workers earn rents is an issue that is probably hard to settle. In our
model rents take the form of a relatively high public sector wage rate, but the wage rates in the
model should be interpreted as wages per unit of eﬀort for wage diﬀerentials to be an appropriate
indicator of rents. Thus, even if empirical studies were to reveal that public sector wage rates
do not exceed the wages for similar groups of workers in the private sector, this would not
necessarily imply the absence of rents in the public sector.
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lobby oﬃcials working in the political campaign.9 According to (2.17), the more
the campaign eﬀort in support of party B exceeds the eﬀort in favour of party A,
the stronger is the voter bias in favour of party B on election day. We assume that
campaign eﬀorts cannot be negative, i.e. the lobby cannot extract real resources
from politicians, only political concessions. Let pA denote the probability that
party A wins the election so that 1 − pA is the probability that party B carries
the election day. Lobby oﬃcials choose their campaign eﬀorts to maximise the
following objective function (L), representing the lobby members’ expected utility
from the election outcome, net of the cost of lobby eﬀort:
L = pAUAi + (1− pA)UBi −
1
2
¡
Z2A + Z
2
B
¢
(2.18)
The negative third term in (2.18) assumes convex costs of campaign eﬀorts, reflect-
ing increasing marginal disutility of eﬀort. Note that the individual ideological
preferences have cancelled out in the lobby’s objective function, since the prefer-
ence variable ρji has zero mean value and the lobby maximises the average utility
of its members.
The timing of political events is as follows: 1) Each party announces a fiscal
policy package, taking the number of insiders and the policy platform chosen by
the other party as given. 2) Lobby oﬃcials choose their campaign eﬀorts. 3)
‘Nature’ chooses the value of the stochastic voter preference variable ω. 4) Elec-
tions are held. 5) The pre-announced policy of the winning party is implemented,
and the ‘marginal’ public sector jobs are allocated among outsiders (by a proces
to be specified below). For simplicity we assume that the individual ideological
preferences ρji and ρ
v
o follow an identical uniform distribution and that the general
ideological preference variable ω is uniformly distributed on the interval
h
− 1
2ψ ,
1
2ψ
i
.
On these assumptions Appendix 1 demonstrates that the optimal campaign eﬀorts
are
ZA = max
£
0, αiψh
¡
UAi − UBi
¢¤
, ZB = max
£
0, αiψh
¡
UBi − UAi
¢¤
. (2.19)
9The ZP -variables could also be interpreted as monetary campaign contributions. The exact
interpretation is unimportant since ZP will be zero in political equilibrium, as we demonstrate
below.
13
Thus the lobby will only support a party that oﬀers its members a higher level
of economic welfare than the other party. Moreover, Appendix 1 shows that the
probability that party A will win the election is
pA =
1
2
+ αipi ·
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
+ (1− αi) po ·
¡
UAo − UBo
¢
, (2.20)
0 ≤ αi < 1, pi = ψ + αiψ2h2, po = ψ.
In other words, the greater an insider’s economic welfare implied by the policy
of party A, the greater is the likelihood that he will vote for that party, given
the economic policy package oﬀered by party B. In a similar way, party A can
increase its voter support from outsiders by choosing a fiscal policy platform that
increases the (expected) economic welfare of members of that goup of voters.
Maximisation of pA, given UBi and UBo , gives party A’s best response to the
policy chosen by partyB. The latter party faces the symmetric problem of maxim-
ising 1− pA, yielding similar first-order conditions and an identical best-response
function. In Nash equilibrium the two parties therefore end up choosing the same
fiscal policy platforms implying UAi − UBi = 0, so according to (2.19) the public
sector lobby will not want to oﬀer any campaign contributions in political equilib-
rium.10 Thus the political influence of the lobby derives from the potential rather
than from the actual political support that it oﬀers.
The economic welfare of an insider is simply equal to the utility of a public
sector worker (Ug), that is, Ui = Ug = u
¡
W + rk
¢
+ g (G) (since both parties
choose the same policy in equilibrium, we no longer attach party superscripts to
any variables). The expected economic welfare of an outsider, Uo, depends on
the probability that he will be able to get one of the high-paying public sector
jobs that have not already been reserved for the lobby insiders. For simplicity we
assume that all outsiders face the same probability of getting one of the marginal
public sector jobs, as if these jobs were allocated by a lottery. The total number
of public sector jobs is α of which αi < α are reserved for the lobby members.
Hence (α− αi) is the number of public sector jobs oﬀered to outsiders, and 1−αi
is the number of outsiders competing for those jobs. Thus, at the time of voting,
10This is why our model specification in section 2.3 did not explicitly allow for lobby activities
as one possible use of the economy’s resources.
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(α− αi) / (1− αi) is the probability that an outsider will gain access to a public
sector job, so the expected utility of an outsider is
Uo =
µ
α− αi
1− αi
¶
Ug +
∙
1−
µ
α− αi
1− αi
¶¸
Up
=
µ
α− αi
1− αi
¶
u
¡
W + rk
¢
+
∙
1−
µ
α− αi
1− αi
¶¸
u
¡
w + rk
¢
+ g (G)(2.21)
where we recall that Up is the utility of a private sector employee and that those
outsiders who do not get a public sector job (the number of which is 1 − α) all
end up finding employment in the private sector, due to flexible adjustment of the
private sector wage rate w.
When choosing a fiscal policy package (W,G, τ), politicians face the technolo-
gical and market constraints (2.4), (2.13) and (2.14) plus the government budget
constraint which requires that the revenue from capital taxation must cover the
cost of the wages to public sector employees:
τ (1− α) k (r + τ) = αW. (2.22)
Moreover, in order to be able to attract workers to the public sector, these workers
must be oﬀered a utility level at least as high as that enjoyed by workers in the
private sector. This recruitment constraint in turn requires that
W ≥ w. (2.23)
Our assumption that public sector insiders have full job security also implies that
fiscal policy must satisfy the ‘non-firing constraint’ α ≥ αi. In the analysis below
we assume that this constraint is never strictly binding.11
Our parsimonious model obviously relies on strong simplifications. First, in a
more elaborate political economy framework politicians might try to dole out the
marginal high-paying public sector jobs in return for political support. Second,
the model feature that campaign contributions are zero in equilibrium derives
from an implicit assumption that all voters are equally well informed. As shown
by Baron (1994), when voters have diﬀerent information sets it may be optimal
for lobbies to oﬀer positive campaign contributions in equilibrium to influence
11If it were binding, we would have a relatively uninteresting scenario with an exogenous
allocation of labour between the public and the private sector.
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uninformed voters.12 Third, like other static probabilistic voting models, our
model neglects the potential time inconsistency problem in the political process,
implicitly assuming that reputation mechanisms keep politicians from defaulting
on their campaign promises.
In addition to ensuring analytical tractability, the above simplifications allow
a precise definition of the popular concept of ‘political distortion’. In the analysis
below we shall thus measure the degree of political distortion by the following
parameter (using the specifications from (2.20)):
δ ≡ αi ·
µ
pi − po
po
¶
= α2ih
2ψ. (2.24)
The political distortion is the product of the predetermined size of the public sector
lobby (αi) and the relative increase in votes a political candidate may expect
to gain by catering to the economic interests of insiders rather than outsiders,
(pi − po) /po. The more δ exceeds zero, the greater is the political influence of
public sector insiders relative to that of other voters. It is intuitive that the
political distortion is greater the larger the lobby and the greater the impact of
lobby eﬀorts on voter preferences (the higher the value of h). We also see that a
smaller dispersion of ideological preferences (a higher value of ψ which reduces the
interval over which ideological preferences are distributed) increases the political
distortion. When ideological preferences are fairly similar across a large number
of lobby members, an increase in the economic benefits oﬀered by one party to
lobby members will induce many of them to shift their vote in favour of that party,
and hence the lobby becomes more influential.
Note how our political setup tries to account for the views of those advocates
of tax competition who argue that the public sector tends to employ too many
people on overly generous conditions: First, because economic benefits oﬀered to
public sector insiders generate more votes than benefits oﬀered to outsiders (as
reflected in the fact that pi > po), our model includes an incentive for politicians
to oﬀer rents to public sector workers. Second, when a political candidate oﬀers
high public sector wages, he may also be inclined to promise more jobs in the
12Lorz (1998) also oﬀers a political economy model with positive lobbying activity in equilib-
rium. In his setting tax competition causes a welfare-increasing drop in lobby activity because it
reduces the ability of the government to redistribute income, thereby diminishing the expected
gain from lobbyism. However, unlike the present paper, Lorz (op.cit.) does not provide an
explicit description of the voting process.
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public sector, since (2.20) and (2.21) imply that this will increase an outsider’s
expected economic gain from voting for that candidate.13 On the other hand, a
relatively high public sector wage rate makes the creation of public sector jobs
more expensive by requiring a higher tax rate. Hence politicians must trade oﬀ
the political gain from high public sector wages and public sector job creation
against the political cost of having to raise taxes. The next section analyses the
resulting political equilibrium.
3. Political equilibrium, tax competition and rents
3.1. Political equilibrium
In political equilibrium the fiscal policy variables W , G, and τ are set so as to
maximise the probability of election victory (2.20), subject to the government
budget constraint (2.22) and the recruitment constraint (2.23). The first-order
conditions for the solution to this problem are derived in Appendix 2. When the
constraint W ≥ w is not strictly binding, these conditions can be shown to imply
that
u0g =
µ
α
α+ δ
¶µ
1− αn
1− αn − ε
¶
u0p, ε ≡ −
µ
n− 1
n
¶
τk0
k
, (3.1)
g0 (α)
u0g
+
ug − up
u0g (1 + δ)
=
µ
α+ δ
α+ αδ
¶ ∙
1 +
α (n− 1)
(1− α) (n− α)
¸µ
W
w
¶
FL, (3.2)
where ug ≡ u
¡
W + rk
¢
and up ≡ u
¡
w + rk
¢
are the total utilities of private con-
sumption for public and private sector workers, respectively; u0g ≡ u0
¡
W + rk
¢
and u0p ≡ u0
¡
w + rk
¢
are the corresponding marginal utilities; and ε is the nu-
merical elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate.14
To understand the eﬀects of tax competition on public sector eﬃciency, it is
useful to start by considering the benchmark case of autarky where no interna-
tional capital mobility is allowed. The world economy will then function like a
13When W > w, we have Ug > Up, so from (2.21) we get ∂Uo∂α =
³
Ug−Up
1−αi
´
> 0. It then follows
from (2.20) and (2.21) that ∂pA∂α = Ug − Uo > 0.
14Note that ε is a general-equilibrium elasticity, allowing for the impact of a change in the
domestic tax rate on the world interest rate. Specifically, the tax base elasticity is defined as
ε ≡ −d (k (r + τ))
dτ
τ
k
= −
k0 · ¡dτ + ∂r∂τ dτ¢
dτ
τ
k
= −
µ
n− 1
n
¶
τk0
k
.
where we have used the symmetry assumption plus equation (2.13) to derive the last equality.
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closed economy which we may model by setting the number of countries n = 1.
Suppose for a moment that there is no political distortion, i.e. δ = 0. According
to (3.1) the political equilibrium under autarky then implies u0g = u0p which in turn
implies W = w and ug = up. For n = 1 and δ = 0 equation (3.2) then reduces
to the Samuelson condition g0/u0 = FL. In other words, a political equilibrium
without capital mobility will guarantee a first-best allocation without rents when
there is no political distortion. In this case politicians cannot capture more votes
by oﬀering particular benefits to one group at the expense of another, so vote-
maximising politicians have an incentive to act like a utilitarian social planner
who attaches an equal weight to the welfare of each individual citizen.
What happens if we allow political distortions in favour of public sector workers
while maintaining the autarky assumption? In that case we obtain
Proposition 1: Starting from an undistorted political equilibrium under autarky,
the introduction of a small political distortion in favour of public sector workers
will drive the public sector wage rate above the wage rate in the private sector. It
will also drive up the tax rate but will leave public sector employment unaﬀected.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
According to Proposition 1 the formation of a lobby for (some of the) public
sector workers will induce politicians to create rents to civil servants. Not sur-
prisingly, the tax rate will have to rise to finance the increase in public sector
wages. However, the number of public sector jobs will stay the same because of
two oﬀsetting political incentives. On the one hand, the emergence of rents to
public sector employees provides an incentive for a political candidate to boost
public sector employment, since he can thereby capture more votes from outsiders
by increasing their chances of getting an attractive public sector job (see footnote
12). On the other hand, the emergence of the lobby makes public goods more
expensive by driving up the public sector wage rate. Ceteris paribus, this rise in
the cost of public goods provision induces politicians to oﬀer fewer public sector
jobs. When there is no lobby initially, it turns out that these two countervailing
political incentives exactly neutralize each other.
Since part of the tax increase needed to finance the rise in public sector wage
rates is paid by private sector workers, the disposable income and private consump-
tion of public sector workers must go up. With an unchanged value of α = G, it
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follows that the marginal rate of substitution g0 (G) /u0
¡
W + rk
¢
is driven above
the marginal rate of transformation FL (α), so public goods become underprovided
from the viewpoint of public sector workers. However, since the higher capital tax
rate causes a drop in r (see (2.13)) and a resulting fall in the private consumption
of private sector workers, their marginal rate of substitution g0 (G) /u0
¡
w + rk
¢
will fall below FL (α), so public goods will become overprovided from the per-
spective of private sector workers.
3.2. Tax competition, rent destruction and public goods provision
Consider next the role of tax competition, i.e. the case where n > 1 so that the
tax base elasticity becomes positive, due to international capital mobility. From
(3.1) we can show
Proposition 2: Tax competition will completely eliminate rents to public sector
employees if the political equilibrium under tax competition implies
ε >
µ
δ
α+ δ
¶³
1− α
n
´
. (3.3)
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The condition in (3.3) is very intuitive: the higher is the tax base elasticity ε,
the higher is the marginal cost of public funds, so the more costly (in economic and
political terms) it is for politicians to raise taxes to finance rents to public sector
employees. Hence, if the political distortion in favour of public sector insiders is
not too high (so that the fraction
¡
δ
α+δ
¢
in (3.3) is not too big), tax competition
will prevent rent creation.
However, while tax competition may provide an institutional defence against
rent seeking, as emphasized by the Public Choice school, it will also distort the
supply of public goods, as claimed by the traditional Public Finance school. This
is reflected in
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Proposition 3: When tax competition among small jurisdictions is suﬃciently
strong to eliminate all rents so that u0g = u0p = u0, public goods will be under-
provided and the supply of public goods will satisfy the condition
g0 (α)
u0
=
µ
1
1− α
¶µ
1
1− ε (1− α)
¶
FL. (3.4)
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Under tax competition public goods are underprovided (i.e. g0 (α) /u0 > FL)
since the international mobility of capital causes the tax base to be elastic from the
individual country’s perspective whereas from the viewpoint of the world economy
as a whole it is in fact inelastic. However, under autarky we saw that the supply of
public goods is also distorted, due to the bias in the political process. To evaluate
which regime is likely to generate the biggest distortions, it is useful to consider
a quantitative version of our model.
3.3. Is tax competition good or bad? A numerical general equilibrium
analysis
To illustrate how rents, public goods provision and social welfare may evolve as
the number of competing jurisdictions increases, we simulate a calibrated version
of our model, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function
y = Akβ, A > 0, 0 < β < 1, (3.5)
and preferences of the form
u (C) =
C1−σc
1− σc
, g (α) =
θα1−σg
1− σg
, σc > 0, σg > 0, θ > 0, (3.6)
where the parameter θ reflects the preference for public goods. Assuming β = 0.25
and σc = σg = 5;15 postulating a political distortion δ = 0.12; setting θ = 1, and
calibrating the parameters A and k to ensure a realistic relative size of the public
15In an intertemporal context, our parameter σc would be identical to the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in private consumption. Based on the estimates of the
latter parameter by Hall (1988), σc should be at least 5, whereas the estimates presented in
Attanasio and Weber (1995) imply values of σc between 2.2 and 4.7.
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Table 1. Simulated eﬀects of tax competition
n ε Ww α
τ
r+τ
SW−SWa
|SWa|
1 0 1.1538 0.1349 0.5396 0
2 0.3006 1.0704 0.1231 0.4508 0.0095
3 0.3800 1.0451 0.1200 0.4275 0.0068
4 0.4166 1.0329 0.1185 0.4166 0.0045
5 0.4377 1.0257 0.1177 0.4104 0.0030
6 0.4515 1.0209 0.1171 0.4063 0.0018
7 0.4611 1.0176 0.1167 0.4035 0.0009
8 0.4682 1.0151 0.1165 0.4013 0.0002
9 0.4737 1.0131 0.1162 0.3997 -0.0003
10 0.4781 1.0116 0.1161 0.3984 -0.0008
20 0.4972 1.0047 0.1153 0.3927 -0.0029
30 0.5037 1.0024 0.1150 0.3908 -0.0036
50 0.5087 1.0006 0.1148 0.3893 -0.0042
100 0.5131 1 0.1147 0.3887 -0.0044
10000 0.5181 1 0.1147 0.3887 -0.0045
–––––
Calibration: δ = 0.12, σc = σg = 5, β = 0.25, θ = 1, k = 0.1, A = 0.1.
sector (and a realistic eﬀective capital income tax rate τ/ (r + τ)), we obtain the
simulation results reported in Table 1.16 The last column shows the change in the
level of social welfare relative to the welfare level SW a attained under autarky,
and the first row in the table shows the situation prevailing under autarky.
The second column in the table shows that the elasticity of the tax base gradu-
ally increases with the number of competing jurisdictions. As tax competition
grows more intense, the relative public sector wage rate W/w gradually declines,
and when the number of jurisdictions becomes suﬃciently large, rents are com-
pletely eliminated, i.e., the recruitment constraint W ≥ w becomes binding. Tax
competition also reduces the size of the public sector, but not dramatically so,
since our assumed values of σc and σg imply a relatively low degree of substitut-
ability between public and private goods.
Notice the interesting profile of the welfare change in the last column in Table
1: as the number of countries rises from one to some small number, social wel-
16The complete model implied by the specifications (3.5) and (3.6) is documented in a sup-
plementary appendix available from the authors.
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Figure 1: The borderline between welfare-increasing and welfare-reducing tax
competition (I)
fare rises above the autarky level, because the positive eﬀect of rent destruction
dominates the negative eﬀect of lower public goods provision. However, as the
number of countries increases from eight to nine, implying an increase in the tax
base elasticity from 0.4682 to 0.4737, the welfare gain from tax competition is
turned into a slight loss, as the negative eﬃciency eﬀect of reduced public service
provision starts to dominate. Indeed, in this particular example the maximum
welfare gain from tax competition is attained already when the number of coun-
tries is two, at a tax base elasticity of about 0.3. Given our calibration, this tax
base elasticity represents the optimal intensity of tax competition.
Of course these results are sensitive to the choice of parameter values. One
critical parameter is the degree of political distortion, δ. As the value of this
parameter increases, it takes a higher intensity of tax competition - reflected in
the number of countries and the associated elasticity of the tax base - before
the negative welfare eﬀect of reduced public goods provision starts to dominate
the positive welfare eﬀect of rent destruction. This is illustrated in figures 1
and 2 which show the combinations of the political distortion and the number
of competing jurisdictions (and the implied tax base elasticity) that will lead to
exactly the same level of welfare as that attained under autarky, given the other
parameter values stated in the note to Table 1. For parameter combinations above
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Figure 2: The borderline between welfare-increasing and welfare-reducing tax
competition (II)
the graphs in the two figures, tax competition is welfare-improving, whereas in
the area below the graphs it is welfare-reducing. As one would expect, the figures
illustrate that tax competition is more desirable the greater the political distortion
in favour of public sector voters.
The calibrated version of our model suggests that even a large political distor-
tion can only justify a moderate intensity of tax competition. For example, if the
public sector lobby is a trade union comprising 10 percent of the total work force
(αi = 0.1), the value of δ ≡ αi (pi − po) /po = 0.12 assumed in Table 1 would imply
pi/po = 2.2, that is, the political influence of a public sector insider would be more
than twice the influence of other voters, reflecting a very strong lobby. But even
in this case Table 1 indicates that the tax base elasticity will only have to exceed
0.3 before more intensive tax competition starts to reduce welfare, despite the
fact that further competition does not reduce public goods provision very much,
due to the low substitution elasticity 1/σp = 1/σg = 0.2 between private and
public goods. According to the present model tax competition thus seems a badly
targeted remedy against political distortions, compared to domestic institutional
reform such as restrictions on campaign contributions by lobby groups.
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4. Tax coordination, rents and welfare
The analysis in the two previous sections showed that tax competition among
small jurisdictions has the potential to destroy rents completely, but in that case
it will also cause an underprovision of public goods which could be substantial.
This suggests that an internationally coordinated rise in taxation could be welfare-
improving even if the political process is biased in favour of public sector workers.
Thus, an interesting question is whether tax coordination will raise social welfare
and whether it will do so even if it leads to the emergence of rents? In this main
section we take a closer look at these issues, focusing on the case where individual
jurisdictions are small.
4.1. Tax coordination without rent creation
When the capital tax rate is fixed by some international agreement on tax coordin-
ation, politicians in the individual small country cannot influence k = k (r + τ)
and w = w (r + τ) since they now take τ as well as r as given. However, they
must still find the politically optimal combination of W and α, subject to the
constraints (2.22) and (2.23). If a political candidate oﬀers to raise the public
sector wage rate by the amount dW , it follows from (2.1), (2.20) and (2.21) that
the resulting marginal political benefit (MPB) in terms of the increase in the
probability of election victory will be
MPB =
£
αipiu0g + (α− αi) pou0g
¤
dW. (4.1)
Since the tax rate is fixed by international agreement, a rise in the public sector
wage rate can only be financed through a cut in the number of public sector jobs
and hence in public goods provision. According to (2.1), (2.20) and (2.21), the
marginal political cost (the expected loss of votes) associated with a reduction
|dα| in public sector employment is
MPC = {[αipi + (1− αi) po] g0 (α) + po (ug − up)} |dα| . (4.2)
In the absence of constraints on wage-setting, an optimising politician will
want to equate the above expressions for the marginal political benefits and costs.
However, in a tax competition equilibrium where condition (3.3) holds, it follows
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from the proof of Proposition 2 stated in Appendix 3 that the public sector re-
cruitment constraint W ≥ w is in fact strictly binding. Using this insight, and
noting that (3.3) reduces to ε > δ/ (α+ δ) for n→∞, we can establish
Proposition 4: Starting from a tax competition equilibrium where ε > δ/ (α+ δ)
so that all rents have been eliminated and the public sector recruitment constraint
W ≥ w is strictly binding, the government of a small country will want to spend
all of the extra revenue from an internationally coordinated rise in taxation on
additional public goods provision and will not want to create rents to public sector
employees.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
According to Proposition 4, under the plausible assumption that ε >
δ/ (α+ δ), tax competition in the initial political eqilibrium preceding the in-
ternational agreement has reduced public goods provision to such an extent that
it is not politically expedient for national governments to use any of the revenue
from tax coordination on rent creation.
The initial increase in public sector employment allowed by an internationally
coordinated rise in τ and the resulting eﬀects on factor prices may be found
from the capital market equilibrium condition (2.12) and the government budget
constraint (2.22), using that W = w (r + τ) initially:17
dα
dτ
=
εk (1− α)2
wα
£
α+ εα−1 (1− α)2
¤ > 0, (4.3)
dr
dτ
= −
Ã
1 + εα−1 (1− α)2
α+ εα−1 (1− α)2
!
< −1, (4.4)
dW
dτ
=
dw
dτ
= −k ·
µ
1 +
dr
dτ
¶
=
k
α+ εα−1 (1− α)2
> 0. (4.5)
The derivative (4.5) gives the increase in the public sector wage rate that politi-
cians must grant to keep satisfying the recruitment constraint, but without oﬀer-
ing any rents to public sector workers. The remaining part of the increase in tax
17We use the fact that, with symmetric countries and a harmonised capital tax rate which
is controlled by some international authority, the capital market equilibrium condition (2.12)
simplifies to equation (4.7) below.
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revenue is spent on additional public sector employment, as witnessed by (4.3).
Using these results, we can prove
Proposition 5: Starting from a tax competition equilibrium where ε > δ/ (α+ δ)
so that all rents have been eliminated, an internationally coordinated rise in taxa-
tion will unambiguously increase social welfare, and the welfare gain will be directly
proportional to the initial degree of underprovision of public goods, measured by
the magnitude
³
g0/u0
FL
− 1
´
of the initial deviation from the Samuelson condition.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Since public goods are underprovided in the initial equilibrium, and since Pro-
position 4 established that none of the extra revenue from tax coordination will
be spent on rents, it is not surprising that some amount of coordination will raise
social welfare. Indeed, as long as g0/u0 > FL and MPC > MPB, i.e., as long
as public goods are underprovided and politicians have no incentive to spend the
revenue from tax coordination on rent creation, welfare will be boosted by further
coordinated tax increases.
4.2. Tax coordination with rent creation
But could tax coordination improve social welfare even if it is carried beyond
the point where rents start to emerge? To investigate this, we must derive the
eﬀects of further tax coordination onW, α and r when the supply of public goods
has already been raised to a level where politicians would like to spend part of
a further revenue gain on rents. In that situation politicians will oﬀer a fiscal
policy package (W,G) (with G = α) that satisfies the political optimum condition
MPC = MPB. Using (4.1) and (4.2) and noting from the government budget
constraint (2.22) that dW/ |dα| =W/α (1− α) when the individual country takes
τ and r as given, we find that the condition MPC =MPB implies
(1 + δ) g0 (α) + u
¡
W + rk
¢
− u
¡
w (r + τ) + rk
¢
=
(α+ δ)u0
¡
W + rk
¢µ W
α (1− α)
¶
. (4.6)
When the public sector recruitment constraint is no longer strictly binding, the
eﬀects of tax coordination on W , α and r in the representative small country
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may be found from the simultaneous system consisting of the government budget
constraint (2.22), the political equilibrium condition (4.6) and the capital market
equilibrium condition
(1− α) k (r + τ)− k = 0 (4.7)
which follows from (2.12) when all countries are forced to change their capital tax
rate in a coordinated manner. In analysing this system, we assume that countries
start out from a situation where the public sector recruitment constraint has just
ceased to be strictly binding so thatW = w in the initial equilibrium. The eﬀects
of a coordinated rise in τ on W , α and r are given in equations (A.18) through
(A.20) in Appendix 2. Using those results we obtain
Proposition 6: Once tax coordination has raised public goods provision to the
point where the recruitment constraint W ≥ w is no longer strictly binding, the
following condition is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that politicians will use
part of the revenue from further tax increases to oﬀer rents to public sector work-
ers:
δ + α [1 + α+ γσc (α+ δ)]
+ε
µ
1− α
α
¶∙
1 + δ
1− α + γσc (α+ δ) +
µ
α+ δ
α
¶µ
σg
1 + δ
− 1
¶¸
> 0, (4.8)
γ ≡ W
W + rk
.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
A suﬃcient (but far from necessary) condition for (4.8) to hold is that σg ≥
1+δ. As mentioned in footnote 14, empirical estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion in private consumption (σc) are typically far above unity, so if the
corresponding CRRA parameter for public consumption (σg) is not much smaller,
it will most likely exceed 1 + δ (since δ will not realistically be far above one).
Moreover, even if σg < 1 + δ, all the other positive terms on the left-hand side of
(4.8) are likely to ensure that the condition will hold. For all plausible parameter
values it then follows from Proposition 6 that once tax coordination is carried
beyond a certain point, it will start to generate rents to public sector workers.
Clearly this accords with the Public Choice view that tax coordination stimulates
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rent seeking. However, this does not necessarily mean that a further coordinated
tax increase is undesirable once rents start to emerge. More precisely, we have
Proposition 7: When tax coordination has raised public goods provision to the
point where the recruitment constraint W ≥ w is no longer strictly binding, a
further coordinated rise in the level of taxation will increase social welfare if and
only if the following condition is met:
γσc (α+ δ)
∙
α+ δ
α+ αδ
− (1− α)
¸
> δ + α (2− α) +
µ
α+ δ
1 + δ
¶µ
α2 + δ
α (1− α)
¶
. (4.9)
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Condition (4.9) may very well be satisfied. For example, suppose that ρ = 0.12,
γ ≡ W
W+rk
= 0.8 and α = 0.13. The inequality in (4.9) will then hold for all values
of σc above 3.74. The empirical estimates in Hall (1988) imply that σc is at least
5 and possibly much higher, while the estimates by Attanasio and Weber (1995)
suggest that σc lies in the interval between 1.5 and 4.7. Hence tax coordination
may be welfare-improving even when it generates rents (recall from Proposition
6 that a coordinated rise in taxation will almost surely create rents when the
recruitment constraint ceases to bind). The reason for this result is that public
goods are still underprovided in the initial equilibrium, so if politicians spend part
of the extra tax revenue on an increase in public goods supply - as indeed they
will, given the parameter values assumed in the numerical example above - the
resulting positive welfare eﬀect may outweigh the loss from the distortions caused
by the introduction of rents.18
18To see that public goods are underprovided initially, note from (A.29) in Appendix 3 that the
political equilibrium condition MPB =MPC implies g0/u0 > FL . The fact that a coordinated
rise in τ will increase public goods provision (and not just induce a rise in rents) follows from
(A.18) in Appendix 2 by inserting the assumed parameter values.
Introducing positive rents causes a rise in the private consumption of public sector workers
(if their wage rate rises by more than their tax bill) which may increase the ratio
g0(G)/u0g
FL(α)
. In
that case the pre-existing distortion to public goods supply will increase from the perspective
of public sector workers so that no unambiguous conclusion on the overall welfare eﬀect can be
drawn, even though the distortion to public goods supply will certainly be reduced from the
viewpoint of private sector workers.
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5. Conclusions and suggestions for further research
In this paper we have set up a probabilistic voting model to explore the hypothesis
that tax competition improves public sector eﬃciency and social welfare when a
political distortion favours public sector employees. In our model the political
distortion induces politicians to create rents through high wages to public sector
workers in the absence of tax base mobility. If tax competition is introduced via
the lifting of capital controls, it will reduce the rents to public sector workers and
may well destroy them completely when the number of competing jurisdictions
becomes suﬃciently large. However, tax competition will also cause an under-
provision of public goods by increasing the marginal cost of public funds. Our
analysis indicated that, in the presence of a political distortion favouring public
sector workers, a modest degree of tax competition involving a relatively low tax
base elasticity is likely to be welfare-improving, whereas unfettered tax compet-
ition among small jurisdictions is likely to be welfare-reducing, compared to a
hypothetical situation without tax base mobility. In particular, if tax competition
is suﬃciently strong to eliminate all rents, a coordinated rise in capital taxation
will always be welfare-improving by oﬀsetting the underprovision of public goods.
We also found that it may be welfare-enhancing to carry tax coordination beyond
the point where rents to public sector workers start to emerge.
Overall our analysis suggests that while the advocates of tax competition are
right in claiming that tax base mobility serves to reduce rent-seeking, it is a double-
edged sword that also tends to distort the supply of public goods, as argued by
supporters of tax coordination. Up to a certain point tax competition may play
a useful eﬃciency-enhancing role, but if it becomes too intense it is likely to be
welfare-reducing. Indeed, in a calibrated version of our model we were able to
identify an optimal intensity of tax competition, measured by the elasticity of
the tax base with respect to the tax rate. Our quantitative analysis suggested
that even very large political distortions can only justify a modest intensity of tax
competition. In our model tax competition thus seems a poorly targeted means
of curbing rents, compared to domestic institutional reform.
A natural extension of our analysis would be to allow for taxes on immobile
factors. One could then study whether tax competition for mobile factors will
reduce rents even if politicians can compensate for a lower revenue from the mobile
tax base by raising taxes on the immobile base. We believe the answer to this
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question will be ‘yes’, as long as politicians have an incentive to rely to some extent
on taxation of a mobile factor, say, because it earns location-specific rents accruing
partly to foreign owners, as in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and Sørensen (2004).
In that case politicians will equate the marginal political costs of taxing the mobile
and the immobile factor, so tax competition that raises the marginal cost of taxing
the mobile factor will also raise the overall marginal cost of taxation and force
some reduction in public goods provision. Since optimising politicians equate the
marginal political benefits from rent creation and public goods provision, they
will then also want to curb rents. The simulation results reported by Sørensen
(2004) indicate that even in a setting with taxes on immobile as well as mobile
factors, tax competition can have significant quantitative eﬀects on the marginal
cost of public funds. On this basis one would expect tax competition to have
non-negligible eﬀects on rent-seeking in a political economy setting with multiple
tax instruments.
An interesting empirical exercise would be to investigate if there is any sys-
tematic link between proxies for the intensity of tax competition and relative
public/private sector wage rates for comparable skill groups, as suggested by the
present study. Finally, although we followed the Leviathan literature in assuming
a political bias in favour of ‘bureaucrats’, one can think of alternative settings
where the political proces generates rents to other groups, e.g., in the form of
selective (tax) subsidies or regulations in favour of certain well-organized private
sector interest groups. In such an environment one could still use the general
political economy approach suggested in this paper to study the eﬀects of tax
competition on rent creation and resource allocation.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. The probabilistic voting model with a public sector lobby
In this appendix we derive equation (2.19) giving the optimal lobby campaign
eﬀorts and equation (2.20) determining the probability that political party A will
win the election.
According to (2.16) the lobby swing voter who is indiﬀerent between the two
parties has the ideological bias
ρi = U
A
i − UBi − eω. (A.1)
All lobby members with a value of ρji less than ρi will prefer party A to party
B. If ρji is uniformly distributed on the interval
h
− 1
2φi
, 1
2φi
i
with length 1/φi, the
fraction πAi of lobby members with a value of ρ
j
i less than ρi is
πAi =
ρi −
³
− 1
2φi
´
1/φi
= φi
µ
ρi +
1
2φi
¶
= φi
µ
UAi − UBi − eω + 12φi
¶
. (A.2)
Using (2.17) to eliminate eω from (A.2), we may thus write the probability that a
lobby member will vote for party A as
πAi =
1
2
+ φi
£
UAi − UBi − ω + αih (ZA − ZB)
¤
. (A.3)
In a similar way, if the individual ideological preference of an outsider (ρvo) follows
a uniform distribution on the interval
h
− 1
2φo
, 1
2φo
i
, the probability πAo that an
outsider will vote for party A can be shown to be
πAo =
1
2
+ φo
£
UAo − UBo − ω + αih (ZA − ZB)
¤
. (A.4)
Thus the expected fraction of total votes that will be cast in favour of party is
πA = αiπAi + (1− αi)πAo . (A.5)
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The probability pA that party A will win the election equals the probability that
πA is at least one half. Using (A.3) through (A.5), this condition may be written
as
pA ≡ Pr
ω
£
πA ≥ 1/2
¤
(A.6)
= Pr
ω
∙
αiφi
φ
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
+
(1− αi)φo
φ
¡
UAo − UBo
¢
+ αih (ZA − ZB) ≥ ω
¸
,
where φ ≡ αiφi + (1− αi)φo is the average dispersion of ideological preferences
across the two groups of voters. As the general ideological preference ω is uni-
formly distributed on the interval
h
− 1
2ψ ,
1
2ψ
i
, the probability in (A.6) is
pA =
αiφi
φ
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
+ (1−αi)φoφ
¡
UAo − UBo
¢
+ αih (ZA − ZB)−
³
− 1
2ψ
´
1/ψ
=
1
2
+
ψ
φ
£
αiφi
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
+ (1− αi)φo
¡
UAo − UBo
¢
+ φαih (ZA − ZB)
¤
(A.7)
Lobby oﬃcials choose their campaign eﬀorts to maximise the objective function
(2.18), subject to the constraint that eﬀorts cannot be negative. Since (A.7)
implies ∂pA/∂ZA = αihψ and ∂pA/∂ZB = −αihψ, the first-order conditions for
the solution to the lobby problem may be written as follows, where μA and μB are
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints on ZA
and ZB, respectively:
αihψ
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
−ZA− μA = 0, −αihψ
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
−ZB − μB = 0, (A.8a)
ZA ≥ 0, ZB ≥ 0, μA ≥ 0, μB ≥ 0, μAZA = 0, μBZB = 0.
(A.8b)
From (A.8) we get the results stated in (2.19) which in turn imply that
ZA − ZB = αihψ
¡
UAi − UBi
¢
. (A.9)
Substituting (A.9) into (A.7), we find
pA =
1
2
+
ψ
φ
£
αi
¡
φi + φαiψh
2
¢ ¡
UAi − UBi
¢
+ (1− αi)φo
¡
UAo − UBo
¢¤
. (A.10)
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If φo is suﬃciently large, reflecting a small dispersion of the ideological preferences
of outsiders, we may have φo > φi+φαiψh2. In that case it follows from (A.10) that
the individual outsider is politically more influential than the individual insider,
as noted in section 2.4. However, in the benchmark case where φo = φi = φ,
(A.10) simplifies to equation (2.20) in the text, representing the situation where
lobby members have greater political power.
Appendix 2. The political equilibrium
This appendix explains the derivation of the political equilibrium presented
in section 3.1 and reports some comparative-static results which are used in the
proofs of the propositions stated in Appendix 3.
Using (2.20), (2.21) plus the facts that Ui = Ug = u
¡
W + rk
¢
+ g (G) and
G = α, we construct the Lagrangian £ corresponding to the maximisation problem
specified at the start of section 3.1,
$ =
1
2
+ αipi
£
u
¡
W + rk
¢
+ g (α)− UBi
¤
+(1− αi) po
∙µ
α− αi
1− αi
¶
u
¡
W + rk
¢
+
µ
1− α
1− αi
¶
u
¡
w (r + τ) + rk
¢
+ g (α)− UBo
¸
+λ [τ (1− α) k (r + τ)− αW ] + η [W − w (r + τ)] ,
where η is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the recruitment constraint
W ≥ w. Exploiting (2.13), (2.14) and the fact that (1− α) k = k in symmetric
capital market equilibrium, we find the first-order conditions for maximisation
with respect to W , α and τ to be
∂$/∂W = 0 =⇒ [αipi + (α− αi) po]u0g − αλ+ η = 0, (A.11)
∂$/∂α = 0 =⇒ [αipi + (1− αi) po] g0 + po (ug − up)− λ (τk +W )
+
k
n (1− α) k0
£
kαiu0g (pi − po) + kαpo
¡
u0g − u0p
¢
+ λτ (1− α) k0 + ηk
¤
= 0,
(A.12)
∂$/∂τ = 0 =⇒ λ (1− α) (k + τk0) + ηk − (1− α) kpou0p
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−1
n
£
kαiu0g (pi − po) + kαpo
¡
u0g − u0p
¢
+ λτ (1− α) k0 + ηk
¤
= 0. (A.13)
When the recruitment constraint is not strictly binding, we have η = 0. Using
the government budget constraint τk =
¡
α
1−α
¢
W to eliminate τk, the reader may
verify that (A.11) through (A.13) then lead to (3.1) and (3.2) in section 3.1.19
Consider now the case of autarky and suppose that W > w so that η = 0.
Setting n = 1 and noting from the government budget constraint that W = τk/α
under autarky, we may then write (3.1) and (3.2) in the form
αu0
¡
w (r (α, τ) + τ) + r (α, τ) k
¢
− (α+ δ)u0
µ
τk
α
+ r (α, τ) k
¶
= 0, (A.14)
α2g0 (α) (1 + δ) + α2
∙
u
µ
τk
α
+ r (α, τ) k
¶
− u
¡
w (r (α, τ) + τ) + r (α, τ) k
¢¸
− (α+ δ) τku0
µ
τk
α
+ r (α, τ) k
¶
= 0, (A.15)
where the derivatives of the function r (α, τ) are given by (2.13) and (2.14). Taking
total diﬀerentials of (A.14) and (A.15), evaluating the derivatives in an initial
equilibrium where δ = 0 (so that W = w, ug = up and u0g = u0p initially), and
defining bε ≡ −τk0/k, we get (using (2.13) and (2.14) with n = 1 plus the facts
that τk = αw and g0 = u0w in the initial undistorted equilibrium):"
wu00
h
1 + 1?ε
¡
α
1−α
¢2i −ku00
αg00 − wu0?ε
¡
α
1−α
¢2
+ w2u00
£
1 + α?ε
¡
α
1−α
¢¤
−wu00k (1− α)
#"
dα
dτ
#
="
u0 · dδ
wu0 (1− α) · dδ
#
Applying Cramer’s rule to this system, we find that
∂α
∂δ
= 0, (A.16)
∂τ
∂δ
=
u0g0
?ε
¡
α
1−α
¢2 − αu0 (g00 + w2u00)
u00k
£
α (g00 + w2u00)− g0?ε
¤ > 0. (A.17)
Thus the introduction of a small political distortion will drive up the tax rate but
leave public sector employment unchanged, as reported in section 3.1.
19A detailed derivation of (3.1) and (3.2) from (A.11) through (A.13) is provided in a supple-
mentary appendix available from the authors.
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We turn next to the eﬀects of tax coordination with rent creation discussed in
section 4.2. Assume that the equilibrium value of W implied by (2.22), (4.6) and
(4.7) will indeed satisfy the recruitment constraint W ≥ w. From these equations
and the assumption made in section 4.2 that W = w initially, one can then show
that
dα
dτ
=
(ε/τ) (1− α) {(α+ δ) [1− γσc (1− α)]− α (1− α)}
∆
, (A.18)
dW
dτ
=
µ
kε (1− α)
α∆
¶½µ
α+ δ
α
¶µ
1− σg
1 + δ
¶
−
µ
1 + δ
1− α
¶
− γσc (α+ δ)
¾
−
µ
k
∆
¶
[α+ γσc (α+ δ)] , (A.19)
dr
dτ
=
µ
ε (1− α)
∆
¶½
2− α+
µ
α+ δ
α
¶ ∙
α
1− α + γσc +
σg
1 + δ
¸¾
+
µ
1
∆
¶
[γσc (α+ δ)− δ] , (A.20)
∆ ≡ −εk (1− α)
½
2− α+
µ
α+ δ
α
¶ ∙
α
1− α + γσc +
σg
1 + δ
¸¾
− α [α+ γσc (α+ δ)] < 0, (A.21)
γ ≡ W
W + rk
, σc ≡ −C
u00
u0
, σg ≡ −α
g00
g0
,
where σc is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in private consumption (which
is identical for private and public sector workers in the initial equilibrium) and σg
is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in public consumption. As mentioned,
these results hold provided W ≥ w. If this condition is satisfied initially, it will
continue to be met if dW ≥ dw. Noting from (2.11) that dw/dτ = −k
¡
1 + drdτ
¢
and using (A.19) and (A.20), we find
dW
dτ
− dw
dτ
=
µ
−k
∆
¶
{δ + α [1 + α+ γσc (α+ δ)]}
−
µ
εk (1− α)
α∆
¶ ∙
1 + δ
1− α + γσc (α+ δ) +
µ
α+ δ
α
¶µ
σg
1 + δ
− 1
¶¸
. (A.22)
The proof of Proposition 6 given in Appendix 3 utilises (A.21) and (A.22).
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Appendix 3. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: From (3.1) it follows that for n = 1 a positive value of δ
will drive u0g ≡ u0
¡
W + rk
¢
below u0p ≡ u0
¡
w + rk
¢
. Since u00 < 0, this requires
W > w. Moreover, according to equations (A.16) and (A.17) in Appendix 2 we
have
∂τ
∂δ
> 0,
∂α
∂δ
= 0 for n = 1 and δ = 0 initially. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Condition (3.3) in Proposition 2 is equivalent toµ
α
α+ δ
¶µ
1− αn
1− αn − ε
¶
> 1. (A.23)
Consider equation (3.1) which was derived from the politician’s first-order condi-
tions on the assumption that the recruitment constraint W ≥ w is not binding.
According to (3.1) the inequality in (A.23) would imply u0g ≡ u0
¡
W + rk
¢
> u0p ≡
u0
¡
w + rk
¢
, but since this would requireW < w, it would violate the recruitment
constraint. Hence this constraint must be binding when (3.3) holds, implying the
absence of rents. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The proposition considers a case with many small juris-
dictions (n → ∞) where tax competition has eliminated rents so that W = w,
ug = up and u0g = u0p = u0. The first-order conditions (A.11) through (A.13) in
Appendix 2 then simplify to
po (α+ δ)u0 − αλ+ η = 0, (A.24)
po (1 + δ) g0 − λ (τk +W ) = 0, (A.25)
λ (1− α) (k + τk0) + ηk − (1− α) kpou0 = 0, (A.26)
where we have used the definition δ ≡ αi (pi − po) /po. Inserting (A.24) into (A.26)
and noting from (3.1) that ε = −τk0/k when n→∞, we get
η ≡ pou0 (1− α)
µ
ε (α+ δ)− δ
1− ε (1− α)
¶
. (A.27)
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Substituting the government budget constraint τk =
¡
α
1−α
¢
W into (A.25) and
solving for λ, we obtain
λ = po (1− α) (1 + δ)
µ
g0
FL
¶
, (A.28)
where we have used the fact that the absence of rents impliesW = w = FL. Equa-
tion (3.4) in Proposition 3 is found by substituting (A.27) and (A.28) into (A.24)
and rearranging. The fraction g0/u0 in (3.4) is the marginal rate of substitution
between private and public goods, and FL is the marginal rate of transformation.
Since
¡
1
1−α
¢ ³
1
1−ε(1−α)
´
> 1, it follows immediately from (3.4) that g0/u0 > FL,
implying that public goods are underprovided relative to the first-best allocation.
¥
Proof of Proposition 4: The proposition assumes that tax coordination starts out
from a tax competition equilibrium without rents where W = w = FL, u0g = u0p =
u0 and ug = up. Further, when the individual country takes τ as well as r as
given, it follows from the government budget constraint (2.22) that dW/ |dα| =
W/α (1− α). Inserting these relationships into (4.2) and dividing the resulting
expression by (4.1), we get
MPC
MPB
=
µ
g0 (α)
u0FL
¶µ
α (1− α) (1 + δ)
α+ δ
¶
. (A.29)
By Proposition 3 the initial tax competition equilibrium satisfies (3.4) which may
be substituted into (A.29) to give
MPC
MPB
=
α+ αδ
α+ δ − ε (α+ δ) (1− α) . (A.30)
From Proposition 2 and the assumption n →∞ it follows that ε > δ/ (α+ δ) in
the initial tax competition equilibrium without rents. The expression on the right-
hand side of (A.30) must therefore be greater than one, implyingMPC > MPB.
Since MPC is the marginal political cost of reducing public sector employment
and MPB is the marginal political gain from spending the freed-up resources
on higher public sector wages, an unconstrained politician would thus want to
cut the public sector wage rate in order to expand public employment, but the
binding recruitment constraint W ≥ w prevents him from doing so. When tax
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coordination allows individual countries to raise more revenue, politicians will
therefore want to spend all of the increased revenue on expanding public sector
employment, apart from any revenue that may be needed to continue satisfying
the recruitment constraint. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Using (2.11) and (2.15), the social welfare function (2.5)
may be written as
SW = αu
¡
W + rk
¢
+ (1− α)u
¡
w (r + τ) + rk
¢
+ g (α) ,
which may be diﬀerentiated to give (using w0 = −k and the fact that (1− α) k = k
in symmetric equilibrium):
dSW
dτ
=
⎛
⎝g0 +
= 0 initiallyz }| {
ug − up
⎞
⎠ · dα
dτ
+ αu0g ·
dW
dτ
+ αk
⎛
⎝
= 0 initiallyz }| {
u0g − u0p
⎞
⎠ dr
dτ
− ku0p. (A.31)
Inserting (4.3) through (4.5) into (A.31) and remembering that ug = up, u0g = u0p
and dW = dw initially, we find by using w = FL that
dSW
dτ
=
µ
u0k
α+ εα−1 (1− α)2
¶"µ
g0
u0
¶Ã
ε (1− α)2
wα
!
+ α−
£
α+ εα−1 (1− α)2
¤#
=
Ã
u0kε (1− α)2
α2 + ε (1− α)2
!µ
g0/u0
FL
− 1
¶
. (A.32)
Equation (A.32) shows that the welfare gain from tax coordination is proportional
to the initial degree of underprovision of public goods,
³
g0/u0
FL
− 1
´
, as measured
by the deviation from the Samuelson condition which requires g
0/u0
FL
= 1. From
Proposition 3 we know that equation (3.4) must hold in the initial tax competition
equilibrium. Inserting this expression for g
0/u0
FL
into (A.32), we finally obtain
dSW
dτ
=
Ã
u0kε (1− α)2
α2 + ε (1− α)2
!∙µ
1
1− α
¶µ
1
1− ε (1− α)
¶
− 1
¸
> 0. ¥
(A.33)
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Proof of Proposition 6: Since we know from (A.21) that ∆ < 0, it follows directly
from (A.22) that condition (4.8) in Proposition 6 is necessary and suﬃcient to
ensure that dWdτ −
dw
dτ > 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Inserting (A.18) and (A.19) into (A.31), one finds the
following welfare eﬀect of a further coordinated increase in the capital tax rate
at the point where the recruitment constraint just ceases to bind (so that we still
have ug = up and u0g = u0p = u0 initially):µ
−α∆
u0ε (1− α)
¶µ
dSW
dτ
¶
= γσc (α+ δ)
∙
α+ δ
α+ αδ
− (1− α)
¸
−
∙
δ + α (2− α) +
µ
α+ δ
1 + δ
¶µ
α2 + δ
α (1− α)
¶¸
(A.34)
Since ∆ < 0 according to (A.21), it follows directly from (A.34) that the con-
dition (4.9) stated in Proposition 7 is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee that
dSW/dτ > 0. ¥
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